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The secondary market for bank shares in
nineteenth-century Britain
GRAEME G. ACHESON and JOHN D. TURNER1
University of Ulster and Queen’s University of Belfast
g.acheson@ulster.ac.uk and j.turner@qub.ac.uk
Stock transferability is regarded as a basic characteristic of the corporation, enabling
businesses to continue even though their ownership is in constant flux.2 Indeed,
some scholars attribute the emergence of the corporation to the advantages which
transferable shares provide investors.3 In modern capital markets, easily transferable
and liquid company shares are regarded as vital characteristics because they permit
investors to encash and diversify their assets at low cost.4 Ultimately, tradability and
liquidity create incentives for economic agents to invest in long-run projects,
which results in productivity growth and, eventually, economic growth.5
Although a market for company shares had existed for just over two centuries in
Britain, there was a dramatic increase in the breadth and depth of this market in
the nineteenth century. Previous studies of the nineteenth-century capital market
have focused on the promotion of companies, sources of capital and the characteristics
1 Turner acknowledges financial support provided by the trustees of the Houblon-Norman Fund and a
British Academy grant (SG-). We are indebted to Edwin Green for his advice and encourage-
ment at the beginning of this project. The access to archive material at Barclays, Lloyds-TSB, HBOS,
Royal Bank of Scotland Group andHSBCwas very much appreciated. Thanks to all the archivists who
have looked after us: Jessie Campbell, Edwin Green, Seonaid McDonald, Rosemary Moore, Helen
Redmond, Ruth Reed, Karen Sampson, Reto Tschan, Philip Winterbottom, Lucy Wright and
Sian Yates.
2 R. R. Kraakman, P. Davies, H. Hansmann et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a Comparative and
Functional Approach (Oxford, ), pp. –.
3 R. B. Ekelund and R. D. Tollison, ‘Mercantilist origins of the corporation’, The Bell Journal of
Economics,  (); R. B. Ekelund and R. D. Tollison, ‘Tradeable shares and the supply-side of cor-
porate development: reply’, The Bell Journal of Economics,  ().
4 A. Bhide, ‘The hidden costs of stock market liquidity’, Journal of Financial Economics,  (), p. ;
T. Chordia, R. Roll and A. Subrahmanyam, ‘Market liquidity and trading activity’, Journal of Finance,
 (), p. ; S. Woodward, ‘Limited liability in the theory of the firm’, Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics,  (), p. .
5 R. Levine and S. Zervos, ‘Stock markets, banks, and economic growth’, American Economic Review,
 ().
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of investors in railway and banking companies.6 However, apart from the organisation
of stock exchanges,7 the secondary market for company shares in the nineteenth
century has been relatively neglected by scholars.8 In particular, we know very
little about the level and determinants of trading activity and liquidity on
nineteenth-century equity markets.
Using all the available data garnered from an extensive trawl of bank archives, this
article analyses the tradability and liquidity of the secondary market for bank shares in
the nineteenth century. Joint-stock banks were a major contributor to the growth of
the nineteenth-century capital market: in the two decades following the liberalisation
of banking incorporation law in the mid s, circa  English and  Scottish joint-
stock banks were established.9 By , the banking sector was the largest in the
British equity market, constituting just over  per cent of total issues.10
Our dataset not only enables us to analyse how tradability and liquidity changed
over the century but, importantly, it enables us to ascertain the determinants of liquid-
ity in the nineteenth-century capital market. First, it is believed that ownership con-
centration has a detrimental impact upon liquidity.11 As diffusion of ownership and
geographical diffusion of owners varies greatly across nineteenth-century British
banks, we can assess the impact of ownership structure on liquidity. A major
6 B. L. Anderson and P. L. Cottrell, ‘Another Victorian capital market: a study of banking and bank
investors on Merseyside’, Economic History Review,  (); S. A. Broadbridge, ‘The sources of
railway share capital’, in M. C. Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy: Studies in Finance and
Economic Growth (New York, ); L. Newton, ‘Towards financial integration: the development
of English joint banks in London and the provinces’, in U. Olsson (ed.), Business and European
Integration Since : Regional, National and International Perspectives (Göteborg, ); M. C. Reed,
‘Railways and the growth of the capital market’, in M. C. Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian
Economy: Studies in Finance and Economic Growth (New York, ); M. C. Reed, Investment in
Railways in Britain, – (Oxford, ).
7 R. C. Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in
Nineteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, ); R. C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: a History
(Oxford, ); W. A. Thomas, The Provincial Stock Exchanges (London, ).
8 A notable exception is the recent work of Hickson and Turner. See C. R. Hickson and J. D. Turner,
‘Shareholder liability regimes in English banking: the impact upon the market for shares’, European
Review of Economic History,  (); C. R. Hickson and J. D. Turner, ‘Trading in the shares of unlim-
ited liability banks in nineteenth century Ireland: the Bagehot hypothesis’, Journal of Economic History,
 (); C. R. Hickson, J. D. Turner and C. McCann, ‘Much ado about nothing: the introduction
of limited liability and the market for nineteenth-century Irish bank stock’, Explorations in Economic
History,  ().
9 S. G. Checkland, Scottish Banking A History, – (Glasgow, ), pp. –; R. Harris,
Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization (Cambridge, ), p. .
10 R. S. Grossman, ‘New indices of British equity prices, –’, Journal of Economic History, 
(), pp. –. In terms of market capitalisation, banking was the second largest sector after
the railways. In  bank equity constituted . per cent of overall market capitalisation. By
, this figure was . per cent.
11 Bhide, ‘Stock market liquidity’; B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, ‘Market liquidity and performance
monitoring’, Journal of Political Economy,  ().
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contribution of this article is our finding that diffuse ownership is closely associated
with liquid stock.
Second, it is widely believed that extended shareholder liability, which was a
common feature in the nineteenth-century capital market, hindered the liquidity
of the market.12 As all the banks in our study had unlimited shareholder liability
and subsequently limited their liability, we are able to analyse the impact of share-
holder liability extensions on liquidity. Surprisingly, we find that liability doesn’t
appear to affect liquidity.
Third, changes in share denomination are typically believed to affect liquidity.13
Indeed, Jeffreys claims that the fall in share denomination in the nineteenth
century had a liquidity-enhancing rationale.14 As several of the banks in our study
had stock splits, we examine their effect on liquidity: we find that they had an imper-
ceptible impact.
Fourth, we examine the impact on liquidity of having a market listing. Modern
corporations value a listing on a stock exchange partially because it is liquidity-
enhancing. Although several of the banks in our study did not have their shares
quoted/traded on a stock exchange, it appears not to have had a deleterious
impact on their liquidity. Finally, we analyse the impact of directorial self-dealing
on liquidity. Although the directors of modern corporations are typically reluctant
to trade in the shares of their company, in contrast, many of the banks in our study
permitted directors to buy and sell the bank’s shares on behalf of the company.
Based on our evidence, we suggest that this may have enhanced the liquidity of
shares.
The article proceeds as follows. Section I provides some background on the evol-
ution of English and Scottish joint-stock banks with transferable shares. Section II
describes the trading of bank stock. Section III describes our data and methodology.
Section IV examines the long-term trends in the tradability and liquidity of bank
stock. Section V analyses the determinants of liquidity. The final section is a brief
conclusion.
I
Following the financial crisis of , which was attributed to the Bank of England’s
monopolistic position and the concomitant weak state of the partnership banks,15
Parliament introduced joint-stock principles into English banking by enacting the
12 J. B. Jeffreys, ‘The denomination and character of shares, –’, Economic History Review, 
(), p. ; A. Winton, ‘Limitation of liability and the ownership structure of the firm’, Journal
of Finance,  (), p. .
13 T. E. Copeland, ‘Liquidity changes following stock splits’, Journal of Finance  (); K. C. Han,
‘The effects of reverse stock splits on the liquidity of the stock’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis,  ().
14 Jeffreys, ‘Character of shares’.
15 S. E. Thomas, The Rise and Growth of Joint Stock Banking (London, ), p. .
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Banking Copartnerships Act ().16 Unlike the partnership banks which preceded
them, these joint-stock banks had transferable ownership shares. However, despite a
suggestion to introduce limited liability, bank owners were still subject to joint and
several unlimited liability.17
By the mid eighteenth century, Scotland had three state-chartered banks (Bank of
Scotland, Royal Bank of Scotland, British Linen Company), which enjoyed the pri-
vileges of incorporation, limited liability and transferable shares. As these banks con-
fined their business to Edinburgh, merchants in the Scottish provinces began to
establish banks so as to provide a reliable means of payment and increase the avail-
ability of credit.18 These banks, similar to their English counterparts, were restricted
to the partnership form of organisation. However, unlike their English counterparts,
these banks were able to take advantage of Scotland’s flexible partnership law, which
granted partnerships the privilege of having a separate legal personality, and as a con-
sequence they had transferable shares.19 In  the era of joint-stock banking in
Scotland commenced with the establishment of the Commercial Bank of Scotland.
It was followed by the National Bank and Aberdeen Town and Country Bank,
which both commenced in . Although these banks had unlimited liability,
they were significantly larger than the provincial banks in terms of owners and
number of branches. As there was some legal uncertainty regarding these concerns,
legislation was passed for Scotland in  ( Geo. IV, c. ), which confirmed
their legal status as joint-stock companies with unlimited shareholder liability and
transferable shares.20
16  Geo. IV, c. . See P. L. Cottrell and L. Newton, ‘Banking liberalisation in England and Wales,
–’, in R. Sylla, R. Tilly and G. Tortella (eds.), The State, the Financial System, and
Economic Modernization (Cambridge, ), pp. –. A provision within this Act restricted note-
issuing banks from establishing inside a 65-mile radius around London. Remaining legal doubts
with regard to the establishment of non-issuing joint-stock banks within this radius were eliminated
by the Bank of England Privileges Act () –  &  Will. , c. . For further discussion on the
background to this Act see T. E. Gregory, The Westminster Bank Through a Century (London,
), pp. –.
17 B. C. Hunt,The Development of the Business Corporation in England, – (Cambridge, MA, ),
p. . According toWilliam Clay, the Bank of England objected strongly to joint-stock banks having
limited liability. See W. Clay, Speech of William Clay, Esq., M.P. on Moving for the Appointment of a
Committee to Inquire into the Operation of the Act Permitting the Establishment of Joint-stock Banks. To
Which are Added, Reflections on Limited Liability, Paid-up Capital, and Publicity of Accounts, as Applied
to Such Institutions; With Some Remarks on an Article on Joint-stock Companies in the Last Number of the
Edinburgh Review (London, ).
18 Checkland, Scottish Banking, p. ; C. W. Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies –
(Edinburgh, ), p. ; R. S. Rait, The History of the Union Bank of Scotland (Glasgow, ), p. .
19 R. H. Campbell, ‘The law and the joint-stock company in Scotland’, in P. L. Payne (ed.), Studies in
Scottish Business History (London, ), p. ; F. W. Clark, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership and
Joint-Stock Companies According to the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, ), p. .
20 J. S. Fleming, ‘On the theory and practice of banking in Scotland’, Journal of the Institute of Bankers,
 (), p. ; Munn, Scottish Provincial Banking, p. .
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The establishment of unlimited liability joint-stock banks with transferable shares pro-
gressed slowly at first, with English banks and  Scottish banks having formed by .
Subsequently, therewas a rapid expansion of the system,with a further English banks
and  Scottish banks establishing in the period up to and including .21
Several pieces of legislation enacted in the late s permitted banks to adopt
limited shareholder liability.22 By  there were no new limited liability banks in
Scotland, but there were  limited liability banks in England.23 Significantly, the
majority of the established English joint-stock banks did not convert to limited liab-
ility.24 The enmasse conversion of the established banks to limited liability had towait
until the confidence in unlimited liability was undermined by the failure of the City of
Glasgow Bank in October .25 This infamous failure appears to have changed
shareholders’ perception of the risks involved in holding unlimited bank shares,26
and there was also a concern that shares in unlimited banks would be sold to low-
wealth individuals.27 Consequently, great pressure came from shareholders for a
move to limited liability,28 and as a result of this general concern, the Companies
Act29 was enacted in  to aid the conversion of the old-established joint-stock
banks to limited liability.30 The Companies Act partially achieved this by creating
‘reserve liability’, which, if adopted, made shareholders liable for a predetermined
multiple of paid-up capital in the event of bankruptcy. At the end of ,
21 Checkland, Scottish Banking, pp. –; Thomas, Joint Stock Banking, pp. –.
22  &  Vict. c. ;  &  Vict. c. .
23 J. Dun, ‘The banking institutions, bullion reserves, and non-legal-tender note circulation of the
United Kingdom statistically investigated’, Journal of the Statistical Society,  (), p. . This
figure excludes the Bank of England.
24 R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking. (Oxford, ), p. . According to the
Banking Almanac, by , only eight of the established English joint-stock banks had converted to
limited liability, with all but one of the conversions occurring prior to . The banks and the
year of their conversion are as follows: Bank of Whitehaven (), County of Stafford (),
Cumberland Union (), Halifax Commercial (), Liverpool Commercial (), Moore
and Robinson’s Nottinghamshire Bank (), Union Bank of Manchester (), Worcester City
and County ().
25 The City of Glasgow failure has been described as ‘the last serious deposit bank failure in the UK’, M.
Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain, – (Cambridge, ), p. . Although the
failure of this bank did not result in any losses for depositors or note-holders, only  of the
bank’s , shareholders were solvent after the bank’s liquidation, Checkland, Scottish Banking,
p. .
26 L. H. White, Free Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience and Debate – (London, ), p. .
27 L. Levi, ‘The reconstruction of joint stock banks on the principle of limited liability’, The Bankers’
Magazine,  (), p. ; Hickson and Turner, ‘Shareholder liability regimes’, p. .
28 Anon, ‘Banking capital and limited liability’, The Bankers’ Magazine,  (), p. ; Sayers, Lloyds
Bank, p. .
29  &  Vict., c..
30 W. F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint Stock Banking (London, ), p. ;
Gregory, Westminster Bank, vol. , p. .
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no Scottish banks had unlimited liability, and only  out of  English joint-stock
banks had unlimited liability.31
Althoughmost banks only adopted limited liability in the early s, from themid
s, and earlier in the case of Scotland, banks had shares which were personal estate
and transferable, subject to the bank’s own regulations.32 The importance of this
transferability was recognised by a contemporary legal commentator who stated that:
The distinction between a banking copartnership and an ordinary trading partnership consists
in the power and privilegewhich, by the provisions of the deed of settlement of the former, are
given to a proprietor to retire and withdraw his capital from the concern, without a dissolution
of the partnership, by transferring his shares. This power and privilege constitute very many
inducements to the investment of capital in such concerns…33
Given the importance of stock transferability to contemporaries, the focus of this
article is on the determinants of the tradability and liquidity of joint-stock bank
shares in the nineteenth century. The next section goes on to examine the trading
of joint-stock bank shares.
I I
From the s, stock exchanges increasingly acted as intermediaries for traders in
bank stock.34 However, some small banks and banks located in regions which did
not have a stock exchange were usually traded on informal markets, organised by
stockbrokers operating in these localities.35
The only provision in the English Banking Copartnership Act () which may
have directly affected the transferability of bank shares was section , which required
banks to have joint and several unlimited shareholder liability and imposed a post-
sale-extended liability on shareholders. This post-sale-extended liability provision
made shareholders liable for the bank’s debts for three years after they had sold
their shares, and simply prevented opportunistic dumping of shares.36 Although
similar legislation didn’t exist in Scotland, Scottish law held shareholders who sold
their shares liable for debts incurred during their tenure if existing owners were
unable to cover these losses from their own personal assets.37 After the 
31 The banks and the dates of their conversion to limited liability are: Bank of Westmorland (),
Coventry Union Banking Company (merged with rival in ), Lancaster Banking Company
(), Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank (), Stuckey’s Banking Company (), Whitehaven
Joint-stock Bank (), Wolverhampton and Staffordshire Banking Company (merged with rival
in ).
32 C. C. M. Plumptre, Grant’s Treatise on the Law Relating to Bankers and Banking Companies (London,
), p. .
33 Ibid., p. .
34 J. R. Killick and W. A. Thomas, ‘The provincial stock exchanges, –’, Economic History
Review,  ().
35 Ibid., p. .
36 Hickson and Turner, ‘Bagehot hypothesis’.
37 G. J. Bell, Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland (Edinburgh, ), p. .
GRAEME G. ACHESON AND JOHN D. TURNER
Companies Act, English and Scottish banks could register as unlimited liability com-
panies, and as a result reduce their post-sale-extended liability to one year.
Notably, most economists and legal scholars believe that joint and several unlimited
liability greatly diminishes the transferability and liquidity of shares.38 Themain expla-
nation for this view is that there is no anonymity in the market for shares as each share-
holder has to collect information on each candidate owner as well as co-owners due to
the joint and several nature of the unlimited liability requirement. As all the banks
included in our study were established in the early period of joint-stock banking,
they all at one time had unlimited shareholder liability, allowing us to analyse the
effect of unlimited shareholder liability upon transferability. Furthermore, the con-
version of the unlimited liability banks to limited liability will enable us to examine
the extent to which joint and several unlimited liability hindered the transferability
and liquidity of bank shares. Although bank shareholders still had extended liability
after the conversion to limited liability, it was pro rata, implying that shareholders
faced dramatically reduced information costs as the wealth of co-owners had little
bearing on their potential downside risk. Consequently, one should observe dramati-
cally increased stock trading.39
The only other legislationwhich had a direct bearing on the trading of bank shares was
the Sale andPurchase of Shares in Joint StockBankingCompanies Act (), whichwas
enacted ‘for the prevention of contracts for the sale and purchase of shares and stock in
joint stock banking companies of which the sellers are not possessed or over which
they have no control’.40 Although the stated aim of this legislation was to prevent
short selling and speculation in bank shares, it has been suggested that the real aim
was to enable customers to determine exactly who a bank’s shareholders were.41
As well as legal constraints on the trading of bank shares, there was internal govern-
ance of trading. For example, the deeds or contracts of copartnership of English and
Scottish joint-stock banks permitted shareholders to transfer or trade their shares pro-
vided that the prior approbation of the board of directors had been received. The
main rationale for this process was that the existence of joint and several unlimited
liability required a vetting mechanism to prevent low-wealth individuals from
becoming owners.42
38 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, ‘Limited liability and the corporation’, The University of Chicago Law
Review,  (); K. F. Forbes, ‘Limited liability and the development of the business corporation’,
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation,  (); P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock and S. Turnbull, ‘An
economic analysis of limited liability in corporation law’, University of Toronto Law Journal,  ();
H. Hansmann andR. Kraakman, ‘Toward unlimited liability for corporate torts’,Yale Law Journal, 
(); H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The essential role of organizational law’, Yale Law Journal,
 (); Winton, ‘Limitation of liability’; Woodward, ‘Limited liability’.
39 P. Halpern, ‘Limited and extended liability regimes’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Law and Economics (London, ), p. .
40  Vict., c. .
41 F. G. Hall, The Bank of Ireland – (Dublin, ), pp. –.
42 Hickson and Turner, ‘Bagehot hypothesis’.
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In our data sample (see next section), apart from the Sheffield and Rotherham
Bank, banks don’t appear to record instances whenever directors’ approbation of a
transfer was refused. The directors’ minutes and transfer journals of the Sheffield
and Rotherham Bank report ten refusals of transfer in the period –.43
A note beside one of these refusals indicates that the transfer was refused due to
‘the purchaser’s circumstances not being satisfactory’.44 On another occasion, appro-
bation was given ‘if the enquiries be satisfactory as to his respectability’.45 One possi-
bility as to why no other banks reported transfer refusals is that there were none due to
self-selection; no unsuitable person would incur the cost of agreeing to buy shares
knowing that the bank directors would refuse them.
According to Withers and Palgrave, the limitation of liability did not result in
changes to bank deeds with respect to the vetting of share transfers by directors.46
Such vetting was still required because banks either had uncalled capital or reserve
liability. George Rae, the banking expert, noted that:
Directors have the power to make this [shareholders that have adequatewealth to meet all calls]
an indispensable condition of proprietorship: they are empowered by your Deed of Settlement
to reject, as a shareholder, anyone of whom they do not approve…if it is not exercised, por-
tions of the stock may gradually drift into the hands of persons of insufficient substance.47
Nevertheless, given that reserve liability was a pro rata extended liability regime, there
may have been less of an incentive for bank directors to vet share transfers than there
had been under unlimited liability as the admission of low-wealth shareholders into
the bank didn’t impose the same externalities on other owners.
I I I
A comprehensive search of British banking archives was undertaken in order to locate
trading data for bank shares. Our sample includes all of the banks for which we were
able to locate share trading data. One important source of such data is share transfer
journals, which provide details of every share transfer. Unfortunately, only the transfer
books of Sheffield and Rotherham Bank (–) and Bank of Whitehaven
(–) have survived.48 These transfer books, as well as giving the biographical
details of buyers and sellers, state the number of shares transferred.
43 RBS Archives: Sheffield and Rotherham Directors’Minute Books (SR//, SR//, SR//), May
, Feb. , Mar. , June . Sheffield and Rotherham Bank, Bank Shares Transfer Book,
–May  (SR/), Dec.  (), July  (), Aug.  (), July  ().
44 RBS Archives: Sheffield and Rotherham Directors’ Minute Book (SR//), Feb. .
45 RBS Archives: Sheffield and Rotherham Directors’ Minute Book (SR//), June .
46 H. Withers, and R. H. I. Palgrave, National Monetary Commission: the English Banking System
(Washington, ), p. .
47 G. Rae, The Country Banker: His Clients, Cares, and Work from an Experience of Forty Years (London,
), p. .
48 RBS Archives: Sheffield andRotherham Bank, Bank Shares Transfer Book,  –May  (SR/
-); Bank of Whitehaven, Register of Transfers (BWH//).
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Additional sources of trading data include stock journals and share registers.
However, very few of these journals and registers have been preserved due to their
size and minimal archival value. The stock registers and journals of the Ashton,
Stalybridge, Hyde & Glossop (–), Bank of Liverpool (–), Caledonian
Banking Company (–), Central Bank of Scotland (–), Huddersfield
Banking Company (–), Union Bank of Scotland (–), and Wilts and
Dorset Banking Company (–) contain a chronological record of each share
transfer.49
Shareholders’ registers also contain data on share transfers, but such data are not
arranged chronologically; rather they are organised on an individual shareholder
basis. For example, the shareholders’ register of the Hampshire Banking Company
(–) contains  pages with one or two entries per page, and each entry
includes shareholder biographical information as well as the dates of each of their pur-
chases, sales and transfers of the bank’s stock.50 From these entries the trading activity
of this bank’s stock was pieced together. In a similar way, the trading activity of the
Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank was constructed from its share registers (–).51
As directors vetted share transfers, the minutes of the boards of directors were also
consulted. However, the majority of minute books examined either mention nothing
about transfers or contain a general statement to the effect that the board took cog-
nisance of transfers received. Unfortunately, this was the case for several of the
larger banks, e.g. City Bank, London and Westminster, London and County Bank,
London Joint Stock Bank, Manchester and Liverpool District Banking Company,
North and South Wales Bank. Nevertheless, the minutes of six banks contain
details of share transfers; three of these banks ceased recording transfers in their
minute books in the late s, possibly because liability was no longer unlimited
and directors were a lot less circumspect in their vetting, if they even vetted at all.
Using these minute books, data were collected on the share trading of Commercial
Bank of Scotland (–), County of Stafford Bank (–), Leicestershire
Banking Company (–), Liverpool Union Bank (–), Sheffield
and Rotherham Bank52 (–), and Union Bank of London53 (–).54
49 HSBC Archives: Huddersfield Banking Company, Stock Journal (H). Barclays Archives: Bank of
Liverpool, Register of Shareholders (ACC-). Lloyds-TSB Archives: Wilts and Dorset Banking
Company, Shareholders’Register (). RBS Archives: Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde &Glossop Bank,
Stock Register (ASH/). HBOS Archives: Caledonian Banking Company, Transfer Books (//
/-); Central Bank of Scotland, Stock Journal (///); Union Bank of Scotland, Register
of Transfers (// & ).
50 Lloyds-TSB Archives: Hampshire Banking Company Shareholders’ Register ().
51 HSBC Archives: Sheffield and Hallamshire Share Registers (/, /).
52 Details of share transfers in this bank were not recorded in the minute books prior to .
53 The minutes for  and  are missing.
54 HSBC Archives: Leicestershire Banking Company, Minutes of Directors (K to K). Lloyds-TSB
Archives: Liverpool Union Bank, Directors’Meeting Books (& ). RBS Archives: Commercial
Bank of Scotland, Board Minute Books (CS// to CA//); Union Bank of London, Directors’
Minute Books (UNI// to UNI//); Sheffield and Rotherham Bank, Directors’Minute Books
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All these minute books record the names of transferors, transferees and the number of
shares transferred.
The minute books of the National Provincial Bank of England report details of
transfers from  until .55 Unfortunately, it appears that not all transfers
were recorded in these minutes. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between trades in the different types of shares which this bank issued.
As we have no trading data for the vast majority of our banks prior to  (see
second column of Table ), our analysis starts in that year. From Table , we see
that our sample includes the Union Bank of London, which, similar to many
London banks, had few branches, acted as agents for provincial banks and was exten-
sively involved in international finance. In  this was the third largest English bank
in terms of paid-up capital and number of owners. Our sample also includes two of
the larger Scottish joint-stock banks, and two of the smaller joint-stock banks in
Scotland. Finally, we have trading data for eleven provincial banks from a variety of
English regions. As can be observed from Table , these banks range from some of
the smallest provincial banks (e.g. Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde & Glossop Bank and
County of Stafford) to some of the larger provincial banks (e.g. Bank of Liverpool).
As can be seen from Table , the banks in this study include two out of the seven
English joint-stock banks which converted to limited liability prior to . Twelve
other banks in Table  converted after , with one not adopting limited liability
until . With respect to the reserve liability levels of these banks, there are wide-
ranging liability extensions, ranging from zero to . times paid-up capital. The
changes in liability regimes and the variation of reserve liability across banks will
permit us to analyse the impact of liability extensions upon the tradability and liquidity
of bank shares.
Following the usual convention, trading activity is measured by calculating the
number of trades and volume of trade.56 Although the usual method of measuring
market liquidity in the empirical finance literature is to use the bid–ask spread
quoted by market makers,57 no such data exist for nineteenth-century bank
stocks.58 Consequently, in this study, several alternative metrics are used to measure
liquidity. First, the average absolute price change between trades is used because an
(SR// to SR//); County of Stafford Bank,Minutes of the Directors (CST//, CST//, CST/
/, CST//).
55 RBS Archives: National Provincial Bank of England, Minute Book of Court of Directors (NAT//
to NAT//). The minutes up until  did not give details of individual transfers. Prior to this, the
minutes only stated ‘that share transfers were brought before the Court’.
56 Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, ‘Market liquidity’.
57 Ibid., ‘Market liquidity’; H. Demsetz, ‘The cost of transacting’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
(); D. Easley, N. M. Kiefer, M. O’Hara and J. B. Paperman, ‘Liquidity, information, and infre-
quently traded stocks’, Journal of Finance,  ().
58 Furthermore, the bid–ask spread has several limitations as a measure of liquidity, especially for infre-
quently traded stocks; see S. J. Grossman andM. H. Miller, ‘Liquidity and market structure’, Journal of
Finance,  (), pp. –.
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Table . Some characteristics of banks included in study
Bank (est.) Trading data
available
Liability
limited
Reserve
liability
multiplee
Paid-up capital
(£’s)
Number of
branchesf
Share price (£)g
        
English banks
Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde &
Glossop ()
–  .       . . .
Bank of Liverpool () –  .   ,    . . .
Bank of Whitehaven () –  .       n/a . .
County of Stafford Banka
()
–  .       . . .
Hampshire Banking Co.b
()
– – –  c –  d – n/a n/a n/a
Huddersfield Banking Co.
()
–  .       . . .
Leicestershire Banking Co.
()
–  .       . . .
Liverpool Union Bank () –  .       . . .
Sheffield and Hallamshire
Bank ()
–  .       . . .
Sheffield and Rotherham
Banking Co. ()
–  .       n/a . .
Union Bank of London () –  .  , ,    . . .
Wilts and Dorset Banking Co.
()
–  .       . . .
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Table . Continued
Bank (est.) Trading data
available
Liability
limited
Reserve
liability
multiplee
Paid-up capital
(£’s)
Number of
branchesf
Share price (£)g
        
Scottish banks
Caledonian Bank of Scotland
()
–  .       n/a . .
Central Bank of Scotland
()
– – –  – –  – – n/a – –
Commercial Bank of Scotland
()
–  .   ,    . . .
Union Bank of Scotland
()
–  . , , ,    . . .
Notes: aThis bank was known as Bilston District Banking Co. until .
bBecame Capital and Counties Bank in  after merging with the North Wilts Banking Co. in .
c,dThese are the  figures. eThese are the  figures. fThese figures include sub-branches. gThis is the last reported price of the year.
Sources: Banking Almanac and Yearbook, , , , , , ; J. Orbell and A. Turton, British Banking: a Guide to Historical Records
(Aldershot, ); The Course of the Exchange, ; Investors’ Monthly Manual, , .
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important aspect of liquidity is the extent to which large price changes between trades
is absent.59 Unfortunately, there only exists a complete set of price data for four banks.
Second, the number of trades divided by the number of issued shares and volume of
trade divided by the number of issued shares are used as proxy measures of liquidity.
These metrics measure the turnover of issued shares, and are frequently used as
measures of liquidity in inter-market comparisons.60
The archive records of Bank of Liverpool, County of Stafford Bank, Hampshire
Banking Company, Union Bank of London and Wilts and Dorset Bank do not
enable us to distinguish between share sales and gratuitous assignments of shares.
Gratuitous assignments were usually bequests from a deceased shareholder to their
beneficiaries or inter vivos gifts between family members. An inability to distinguish
between share sales and gratuitous assignments may result in an overestimation of
the trading activity (and liquidity) of shares in these five banks. Using data on gratu-
itous transfers for three English banks on which data exist for all gratuitous transfers,
one can assess the dimensions of this potential overestimation. Gratuitous trades
as a percentage of total trades are ., . and . per cent for the Leicestershire
Banking Company, the Sheffield and Rotherham Bank, and the Sheffield and
Hallamshire Bank respectively. The volume of shares transferred gratuitously as a per-
centage of total volume of transfers are as follows: Leicestershire Banking Company
(.), Sheffield and Rotherham (.), and Sheffield and Hallamshire (.).
IV
This section examines the long-term trends in share tradability and liquidity. From
Tables ,  and  several broad trends in trading activity and liquidity emerge. After
the initial flurry and active trading of bank stock in the s, the s and s
are characterised by little activity and relative illiquidity. Overall, trading activity
and liquidity increased somewhat in the s, with trading activity reaching a
zenith in the s and early-to-mid s. Trading, however, was less active and
shares less liquid in the late s and s. Notably, as we can see from Table ,
from the mid s until the end of the century, there appears to be little improve-
ment in the liquidity of bank shares despite major progress in the development of
organised exchanges.
The question arises as to the relationship between the activity in the market
for bank stock and the performance of the overall equity market, as measured by
stock market indices.61 Apart from the ‘bubble’ years of the mid s, the overall
59 Bhide, ‘Stock market liquidity’, p. .
60 K. C. Han, ‘The effects of reverse stock splits’, p. ; Levine and Zervos, ‘Stock markets’, p. ;
J. P. Ogden, F. C. Jen, and P. F. O’Connor, Advanced Corporate Finance: Policies and Strategies (New
Jersey, ), p. .
61 The indices were obtained from A. D. Gayer, A. Jacobson and I. Finkelstein, ‘British share prices,
–’, Review of Economic Statistics,  (); A. D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow and A. Jacobson
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Table . Mean annual trading activity, –
Bank Number of share trades Volume of trade
– s s s s s s – s s s s s s
English banks
Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde
& Glossop
. . . . . . . ,    ,  ,
Bank of Liverpoola . . . . , , , ,
Bank of Whitehavenb . . . .    
County of Stafford Bank . . . . . . .       
Hampshire Banking Co.c . . . . .     ,
Huddersfield Banking
Co.d
. . . . . .      
Leicestershire Banking
Co.
. . . . . . .      , ,
Liverpool Union Banke . . . . ,   
Sheffield and Hallamshire
Bank
. . . . . . . , ,     
Sheffield and Rotherham
Banking Co.
. . . . . ,    
Union Bank of Londonf . . . . ,. . , , , , , ,
Wilts and Dorset Banking
Co.
. . . , , ,
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Scottish banks
Caledonian Bank of
Scotlandg
. . . . . . , , , , , ,
Central Bank of Scotlandh . . . .    
Commercial Bank of
Scotland
. . . .      
Union Bank of Scotland . .  
Notes: aThe figures for the s exclude –, and the figures for the s only contain –. bThe figures for the s only contain
–. cFigures for s only cover –. dFigures for s only cover –. eFigures for s only cover –. fFigures for s
cover –, and figures for s cover –. gThe figures for the s cover –, and the figures for the s cover –. hThe
figures for the s only contain –.
Source: See text.
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Table . Mean annual liquidity, –
Bank Number of share trades/number of shares (%) Volume of trade/number of shares (%)
– s s s s s s Overall – s s s s s s Overall
English banks
Ashton,
Stalybridge,
Hyde &
Glossop
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bank of
Liverpoola
. . . . . . . . . .
Bank of
Whitehavenb
. . . . . . . . . .
County of
Stafford Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hampshire
Banking Co.c
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Huddersfield
Banking Co.d
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leicestershire
Banking Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Liverpool Union
Banke
. . . . . . . . . .
Sheffield and
Hallamshire
Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sheffield and
Rotherham
Banking Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
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Union Bank of
Londonf
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilts and Dorset
Banking Co.
. . . . . . . .
Scottish banks
Caledonian Bank
of Scotlandg
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Central Bank of
Scotlandh
. . . . . . . . . .
Commercial
Bank of
Scotland
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Union Bank of
Scotland
. . . . . .
Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes: aThe figures for the s exclude –, and the figures for the s only contain –. bThe figures for the s only contain
–. cFigures for s only cover –. dFigures for s only cover –. eFigures for s only cover –. fFigures for s
cover –, and figures for s cover –. gThe figures for the s cover –, and the figures for the s cover –. hThe
figures for the s only contain –.
Source: See text.
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Table . Annual average absolute change in prices, –
– s s s s s s
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Huddersfield
Banking
Co.a
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Leicestershire
Banking
Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Liverpool
Union
Bankb
. . . . . . . .
Sheffield and
Rotherham
Banking
Co.
. . . . . . . . . .
Notes: aFigures for s only cover –. bFigures for s only cover –.
Source: See text.
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market in the s and s was relatively flat. Thereafter, riding on the boom of
new securities coming to the market, the market rose from  until the early
s, apart from a substantial collapse in . Up until this point, trading activity
in bank shares, apart from during the mid s mania, appears to mirror the move-
ments in the overall market.62 However, while the overall market falls from  until
the mid s, trading activity in bank shares continues to increase, possibly because
the banking sector performed better than the rest of the market in this period.
Subsequently, the rise of the overall market from the late s and during the
s coincides with a lacklustre period of trading in the market for bank stock.
An interesting issue is the extent to which nineteenth-century financial crises may
have affected the tradability and liquidity of bank stock. The crises of  and 
appear to have reduced trading activity in the shares of most banks. Of the eight banks
for which we have data for the s, six show a substantial fall in trading activity after
the  crisis. Eight out of the eleven banks on which we have data for the s
experience a significant fall in trading activity after the  crisis. Only trading in
the shares of the Commercial Bank of Scotland, Union Bank of London and Wilts
and Dorset appear to be unaffected.
In contrast to the above crises, the  financial crisis appears to have had a neg-
ligible impact upon trading activity. This even holds true for the three Scottish banks
in Tables  and , which is remarkable given that the Western Bank of Scotland,
Glasgow’s premier bank at the time, collapsed in , and its , shareholders
had a call for just over £ m.63 The  crisis, precipitated by the failure of
Overend and Gurney, only affected the Liverpool banks in our sample.64 Despite
concerns that the City of Glasgow failure in  would result in shares being off-
loaded, the trading data for the English banks do not demonstrate any change follow-
ing the City of Glasgow crisis. Unsurprisingly, given the severity of the collapse,
trading of shares in three Scottish banks increased substantially following the City
of Glasgow collapse. This was particularly the case for the Caledonian Bank, which
was the owner of four City of Glasgow shares. This bank was subsequently forced
by the liquidators of the City of Glasgow to cease trading on  December .65
Overall, this evidence is consistent with the view that banks became more robust to
crises over the nineteenth century. One possible explanation is that investors and
depositors came to recognise that unlimited shareholder liability protected both
Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy (Oxford, ); and K. C. Smith and G. F.
Horne, An Index Number of Securities, – (London, ).
62 Cottrell andNewton, ‘Banking liberalisation’, p., suggest that the mania for railway shares lead to a
contraction in demand for bank shares.
63 Checkland, Scottish Banking.
64 The effects of the  crisis were particularly acute in Liverpool (Crick and Wadsworth, Joint Stock
Banking, p. ). P. L. Cottrell, has suggested that the impact of the Overend Gurney crisis on share
trading was more severe than our results suggest. See P. L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance –: the
Finance and Organisation of English Manufacturing Industry (London, ), p. .
65 As this action was merely temporary, the bank reopened in June .
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parties from expropriation by bank directors. Concomitantly, it is generally believed
that banks may have introduced more sophisticated risk-management practices over
this time period.66
V
As the liquidity of stock is an important consideration for the shareholders and man-
agers of companies, in this section we want to ascertain the determinants of (and
potential hindrances to) the liquidity of nineteenth-century bank stock. In particular,
we examine the impact of the following on stock liquidity: ownership structure,
shareholder liability, share denomination, being listed on a market, and directorial
share dealing.
One would expect firms with more diffused ownership to have more liquid
stocks.67 Theoretically, the existence of unlimited liability may turn this on its head
as the costs of monitoring larger numbers of owners could result in diminished
liquidity.68 Nevertheless, a director-vetting mechanism along the lines proposed
by Hickson and Turner would substantially reduce the costs associated with trad-
ing unlimited liability stock so that diffuse ownership should result in more liquid
stock.69 We therefore analyse the impact of ownership structure on the liquidity of
bank stock.
We were only able to obtain detailed shareholder data, which enabled us to calcu-
late ownership concentration measures, for three of our sample banks. In the late
s and early s, the top ten/twenty/thirty shareholders owned the following
percentages of stock: Bank of Liverpool (., ., .); Caledonian Banking
Company (., ., .); Union Bank of Scotland (., ., .).70 On this evi-
dence, we can see that the ownership in these banks was relatively diffuse.71
66 F. Capie and M. Collins, ‘Industrial lending by English commercial banks, s–: why did
banks refuse loans?’, Business History,  (); F. Capie and T. C. Mills, ‘British bank conservatism
in the late th century’, Explorations in Economic History,  (); M. Collins, ‘English bank devel-
opment within a European context, –’, Economic History Review,  (); M. Collins and
M. Baker, ‘Sectoral differences in English bank asset structures and the impact of mergers, –’,
Business History  (); M. Collins andM. Baker,Commercial Banks and Industrial Finance in England
and Wales, – (Oxford, ).
67 H. Demsetz and K. Lehn, ‘The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences’, Journal of
Political Economy,  (); Bhide, ‘Stock market liquidity’.
68 Woodward, ‘Limited liability’, p. .
69 Hickson and Turner, ‘Bagehot hypothesis’.
70 Shareholder lists obtained from HBOS Archives: Union Bank of Scotland Shareholder List (),
UBS //; Barclays Archives: Bank of Liverpool, List of Shareholders (), ACC-;
British Library: Caledonian Banking Company, Official List of Shareholders (), , p. .
71 In the modern finance literature a weak definition of concentrated ownership is when one share-
holder owns more than  per cent of the stock. See R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and
A. Shleifer, ‘Corporate ownership around the world’, Journal of Finance,  (); M. Faccio and
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Table . Ownership characteristics of banks
Bank Number of
shareholders
% of capital stock
per owner
Limit on proportion of shares
owned by individual (%)
Ownership geographically
concentrated?a
     
English banks
Ashton, Stalybridge, Hyde
& Glossop
   . . . . yes
Bank of Liverpool   , . . . . no
Bank of Whitehaven    . . . . n/a
County of Stafford Bank    . . . . n/a
Hampshire Banking Co.   – . . – . yes
Huddersfield Banking Co.    . . . . yes
Leicestershire Banking Co.    . . . . n/a
Liverpool Union Bank    . . . n/a n/a
Sheffield and Hallamshire
Bank
   . . . . yes
Sheffield and Rotherham
Banking Co.
   . . . . yes
Union Bank of London  , , . . . . no
Wilts and Dorset Banking
Co.
 , , . . . . yes
Scottish banks
Caledonian Bank of
Scotland
  , . . . n/a yes
Central Bank of Scotland  – – . – – . yes
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Table . Continued
Bank Number of
shareholders
% of capital stock
per owner
Limit on proportion of shares
owned by individual (%)
Ownership geographically
concentrated?a
     
Commercial Bank of
Scotland
n/a , , n/a . . . no
Union Bank of Scotland , , , . . . . no
Notes: aThe answer to this question is yes if a super-majority (%) of shareholders came from the same county/city/region. Some of the trading
data described in the text above provided details on the location of shareholders. .% of share sales in the ASHG Bank between  and 
were to individuals living in the ASHG area. Between  and , .% of share transfers of Bank of Liverpool shares were to individuals
living outside Liverpool. Only .% of transfers in Hampshire Banking Co. shares between  and  were to individuals living outside
Hampshire. Only .% of share transfers in the Huddersfield Banking Co. between  and  were to individuals living outside
Huddersfield and its immediate environs. Only .% of all stock transfers in Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank between  and  were
to individuals living outside Sheffield. .% of all share sales in the Wilts and Dorset Banking Co. between  and  were to
individuals living in Wilts and Dorset. Using shareholder lists for  obtained from The London Gazette, the top four areas which Union
Bank of London shareholders were located in were as follows: London (.%), Kent (.%), Ireland (.%), Sussex (.%). Using a
Bank of Liverpool List of Shareholders for  (Barclays Archives: ACC-), we found that .% were from Liverpool, .% from
Ireland and .% from Manchester. Using A List of Proprietors of Scottish Bank Shares for  (HBOS Archives: NSAS////), we
found that the shareholders of the Commercial Bank of Scotland and Union Bank of Scotland were distributed throughout Scotland.
Whereas, .% of the Central Bank of Scotland’s shareholders were from the northeast of the country. The Caledonian Bank’s
shareholders were located mainly in the northeast of the country (.%) and the Highlands and Islands (.%). The four banks on which
we have no information undoubtedly had geographically concentrated ownership.
Sources: Banking Almanac and Yearbook, , , . Deeds and Contracts of Copartnership.
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Table  contains two related proxies for ownership concentration: size of the share-
holder constituency and the percentage of capital stock per owner. Based on these
two proxies, three banks in our sample could be described as having relatively
diffuse ownership – Union Bank of London, Commercial Bank of Scotland and
Union Bank of Scotland. Although the Bank of Liverpool is relatively low on
these measures, the evidence from its shareholder list suggests that its ownership
was relatively diffuse. Notably, the Union Bank of London and Bank of Liverpool
have the highest volume-of-trade liquidity measure, and the two Scottish banks
have the highest number-of-trades liquidity measure. The very high share prices of
the two Scottish banks, as can be seen from Table , explains why their volume-
of-trade liquidity measure is lower than that of these two English banks.
At the other end of the spectrum, some of the smallest banks, with high percentages
of capital stock per owner, have the lowest liquidity – Ashton, Hyde, Stalybridge and
Glossop Bank (ASHG), County of Stafford Bank, Huddersfield Bank, Liverpool
Union Bank. Notably, the Liverpool Union Bank and ASHG Bank have a large
volume of trade despite having a low trading frequency. In both cases, this was as a
result of significant block trades taking place as incumbent shareholders consolidated
their holdings.72 Consequently, as can be seen from Table , the number of share-
holders fell significantly for both banks between  and .
Four banks with low shareholder numbers appear to have more liquid shares than
other banks of a comparable size. However, from Table , we can see that the con-
stitutions of these four banks (Hampshire Banking Company, Huddersfield Banking
Company, Leicestershire Banking Company, Sheffield and Hallamshire Banking
Company) placed an upper limit on the number of shares which one individual
could own. By so doing, these banks were preventing a concentrated ownership
arising, and subsequently enhancing the tradability and liquidity of their stock.
Such restrictions were commonplace; however their existence may have been due
to reasons other than liquidity-enhancement.73
As can be observed from Table , the only bank in our sample which dramatically
increased the size of its shareholder constituency was the Union Bank of London.
Unlike the other banks in our sample, this institution was a large metropolitan
bank with access to a large pool of capital. It is notable that in the s, its liquidity
increased substantially, whereas the liquidity of other banks’ shares was stagnant. This
increase occurred after the bank made its rights issue in , resulting in a larger pool
of capital and shareholders.74 The trebling of its shareholder numbers between the
L. Lang, ‘The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics,
 ().
72 Anderson and Cottrell, ‘Another Victorian capital market’, p. .
73 Although several of the larger banks in Table  did not have such provisions, the attraction of holding a
large block in these banks might have been reduced by the low upper limit on the number of votes
any one shareholder was entitled to cast at shareholder meetings.
74 Shareholder numbers increased from  in  to , by .
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mid s and  possibly accounts for the substantial increase in the liquidity of
its stock.
One would normally expect geographically dispersed ownership to result in more
liquid shares.75 However, under unlimited liability, geographically dispersed owner-
ship should result in lower liquidity because of the costs of enforcing the extended
liability.76 As can be seen from Table , the ownership of most of our sample
banks was geographically concentrated. Notably, the four banks with the most
liquid shares are the four banks which do not have their ownership concentrated in
a particular region or city. This may simply be picking up the fact that diffuse own-
ership requires a geographical spread of owners. However, the Caledonian Bank,
although its ownership was diffuse, had a geographically concentrated ownership.
This may explain why its shares were less liquid than those of banks with similar or
even smaller levels of ownership diffusion.
As mentioned above, many scholars believe that liquid capital markets cannot exist
under circumstances where there is unlimited shareholder liability because there
would be no anonymity in the market for shares. Consequently, the limitation of liab-
ility should result in an increase in trading activity and liquidity. However recent work
by Hickson et al. has undermined this preconception.77 As all of the banks in our
sample converted to limited liability, we can test the impact of shareholder liability
on tradability and liquidity.
The Bank of Whitehaven was one of the first unlimited liability joint-stock banks
to convert to limited liability. However, as can be observed fromTables  and , in the
s its shares were no more actively traded or liquid than unlimited liability
comparators.
Table  compares trading activity and liquidity in the five years before and after
banks limited their liability in an attempt to assess the impact limiting liability had
on the market for shares. It is notable that the trading activity of only the
Leicestershire Banking Company and Sheffield and Rotherham Banking Company
increases significantly following the limitation of liability. These, as we shall see
below, were the only two banks in Table  which had stock splits when they
limited their liability.
As can be seen from Table , the limitation of liability had little impact on the
liquidity of bank shares, with the liquidity of several bank shares actually decreasing.
Notably, the shares of the Union Bank of London, the largest metropolitan bank in
our sample, actually fall. One explanation as to why the limitation of liability appears
to have little impact is that banks still had extended liability, and share transfers still had
to be vetted. However, aside from the fact that directors’ incentives to vet may have
dramatically fallen, shareholders’ liability had decreased dramatically and was now
75 T. Loughran and P. Schultz, ‘Liquidity: urban versus rural firms’, Journal of Financial Economics,
 ().
76 Woodward, ‘Limited liability’.
77 Hickson, Turner and McCann, ‘Much ado’.
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pro rata, implying that they were substantially less concerned about the financial stand-
ing of their co-owners.78 Notably, as can be observed fromTable , the tradability and
liquidity of Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank shares appear to be unaffected by its con-
version to limited liability despite its shareholders having no reserve liability. In the
longer term, as can be observed from Table , trading activity and liquidity of most
bank shares declined in the latter half of the s and into the s, probably
due to wider economic conditions affecting the stock market.
Changes in share denomination, in the form of stock splits, are usually associated
with a desire to increase the liquidity of a stock issue.79 Somewhat paradoxically, con-
solidations of share issues or reverse splits have also recently been associated with
liquidity enhancement.80 Notably, our sample allows us to test for the impact of
stock splits on liquidity as it contains three stock splits and two reverse stock splits.
The Sheffield and Rotherham Bank had a -for- reverse stock split in  and its
neighbour, the Sheffield andHallamshire Bank, had a -for- reverse stock split in .
Table . Average annual trading activity and liquidity five years before and after limitation of liability
Bank Number of
share trades
Volume of share
trades
Number of
share trades/
number of
shares (%)
Volume of
trade/
number of
shares (%)
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Ashton, Stalybridge,
Hyde & Glossop
. . . ,. . . . .
Caledonian Bank of
Scotland
. . , , . . . .
County of Stafford Bank        
Huddersfield Banking
Co.
. . . . . . . .
Leicestershire Banking
Co.
. . . ,. . . . .
Sheffield and
Hallamshire Bank
. . . . . . . .
Sheffield and
Rotherham Banking
Co.
. . . . . . . .
Union Bank of London ,. . ,. ,. . . . .
Source: See text.
78 Ibid., p. .
79 Copeland, ‘Liquidity’, p. .
80 Han, ‘The effects of reverse stock splits’.
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The reverse stock split of the Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank was followed by a
reduction in the number of share trades and volume of trade (Table ), and it had a
small negative impact on the liquidity of its stock (Table ). On the other hand,
although the reverse stock split of the Sheffield and Rotherham Bank in 
appears to have reduced the volume of trade, as can be seen from Tables  and ,
this consolidation was followed by an increase in liquidity. A possible explanation
for this finding is that reverse splits decrease the transactions costs of marketing
shares and/or that higher share prices are a good indicator of quality.81
The above two banks also had stock splits in the latter part of the nineteenth
century (Sheffield and Rotherham – -for- split in ; Sheffield and
Hallamshire – -for- split in ), and the Leicestershire Banking Co. had a -for-
stock split in . As can be seen from Tables  and , the Sheffield and
Rotherham and Leicestershire splits had little or possibly a negative impact on the
liquidity of their shares. Although the Sheffield and Hallamshire stock split resulted
in dramatically increased trading activity, both liquidity metrics fall. Therefore,
based on this evidence, it appears that stock splits did not necessarily enhance the
liquidity of nineteenth-century bank stocks. One possible explanation for this
finding is that stock splits were perceived by investors to be adverse signals of a
stock’s quality, which may explain why they were infrequent in this period.
Modern firms are desirous of a stock market listing partially for its liquidity-enhancing
effects. As can be seen from Table , four of the banks in this study did not have their
shares listed on a stock exchange. Notably, for three of these banks, this does not
appear to have affected their liquidity. As can be observed from Table , Hampshire
Banking Company, Leicestershire Banking Company and Wilts and Dorset shares
were liquid relative to banks of a similar size.
Table  contains the annual average absolute change in prices for the four banks for
which complete per-trade-price data exist. The lower the value of this metric, the
more liquid is the stock. Interestingly, according to this metric, Leicestershire
Banking Company, which was not listed on a stock exchange, has the most liquid
shares despite initially being the smallest bank in terms of paid-up capital (Table )
and owners (Table ). This admittedly limited evidence, taken with the above,
suggests that listing on a stock exchange does not appear to have been for liquidity-
enhancement reasons. This may have been because the informal (and unregulated)
markets operated by local stockbrokers were more than adequate substitutes for
stock exchanges.
As can be seen from Table , the deeds of only four banks committed directors, if
requested by the seller, to purchase shares when they had refused to authorise a
transfer. These clauses in the deeds typically stipulated that the price to be paid for
such shares was to be equal to the average price of the last ten transfers.82 These
81 Han, ‘The effects of reverse stock splits’, p. .
82 The exceptions to this are as follows. The Leicestershire Banking Company’s deed (clause ) states
that the at the bank’s AGM, a conventional price would be fixed by a vote. This price had to be  per
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Table . Market listings and directorial dealing
Bank Directors permitted to
buy and sell shares on
behalf of bank
Provisions in deeds
for buying shares if
transfer refused
Markets on which
shares are traded
()
English banks
Ashton,
Stalybridge, Hyde
& Glossop
yes no none
Bank of Liverpool yes no Liverpool
Bank of
Whitehaven
yes yes Whitehaven, Carlisle
County of Stafford
Bank
yes no Birmingham
Hampshire Banking
Co.
yes no none
Huddersfield
Banking Co.
yes no Huddersfield, Leeds
Leicestershire
Banking Co.
yes yes none
Liverpool Union
Bank
n/a no Liverpool
Sheffield and
Hallamshire Bank
yes yes Sheffield
Sheffield and
Rotherham
Banking Co.
yes no Sheffield
Union Bank of
London
no no London
Wilts and Dorset
Banking Co.
no yes none
Scottish banks
Caledonian Bank of
Scotland
n/a n/a Aberdeen,
Edinburgh
Central Bank of
Scotland
yes no n/a
Commercial Bank
of Scotland
yes no Edinburgh, Glasgow
Union Bank of
Scotland
yes no Edinburgh, Glasgow
Sources: Deeds and Contracts of Copartnership. Markets on which shares were traded were
obtained from Investors’ Monthly Manual, .
THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR BANK SHARES 
provisions may have existed to assure shareholders that they could exit their invest-
ment in the bank and liquidate their capital. Notably, the banks which had this
clause typically had more liquid stock than their counterparts.
As can be seen from Table , bank deeds typically permitted directors to buy and
sell shares on behalf of the bank, although they were not obliged to do so. Although
such an activity would be regarded with suspicion in contemporary financial markets,
it may have served a useful purpose in the development of early capital markets by
effectively permitting shareholders to exit on demand, making bank shares more
attractive to investors.83 In our sample, only the Wilts and Dorset and Union Bank
of London did not permit this activity. Notably, in the s–s, when the
market for bank stock was still in its infancy, these two banks had the most liquid
stock in terms of the volume-of-trade metric (Table ). One possible explanation
as to why these two banks didn’t have directorial dealing in stock is that, due to
their size and location, they had a wider pool of potential owners.
Although directorial dealing may have enhanced liquidity, not every contempor-
ary believed it to be beneficial for shareholders. For example, two witnesses before
Parliamentary select committees believed that bank directors shouldn’t trade in shares
because they could opportunistically buy them at below market prices.84 The
practice of directors purchasing shares is believed to have been ended voluntarily
after it was discovered that the directors of the infamous City of Glasgow Bank pur-
chased close to  per cent of its stock to support its price in the months before its
collapse.85
VI
The evidence above suggests that bank shares could be easily traded in the nineteenth
century, and, even by the standards of modern financial markets, the market for bank
shares was relatively liquid. For example, Easley et al. state that onmajor contemporary
stock exchanges it is common for some stocks not to trade for days or weeks, and that
over , stocks on the New York Stock Exchange average less than one trade
per day.86 Our evidence also suggests that the market for bank shares did not
become more liquid over the nineteenth century despite the growth and develop-
ment of organised exchanges.
We also find that the shares of banks which had a diffuse ownership were more
liquid than the shares of banks with concentrated ownership. One implication of
cent below the estimated bona fide real value. The Bank of Whitehaven’s deed (clause ) stated that
the price to be paid should be equal to the average of the previous five transfers.
83 E. A. French, Unlimited Liability: The Case of the City of Glasgow Bank (London, ), p. .
84 British Parliamentary Papers Select Committee Report on Joint-stock Banks, , Evidence of Austin
(Q.) and Select Committee Report on Joint-stock Banks, , Evidence of Gilbart (Q.–).
85 Checkland, Scottish Banking, p. .
86 Easley et al., ‘Liquidity’, p. .
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this result is that the liquidity of the market for shares may have dramatically increased
with the growth of large banks in the second decade of the twentieth century.
Although liquidity is usually perceived as something beneficial to the development
of financial capitalism, there is a school of thought that suggests that capital markets
can be too liquid, thus undermining governance by encouraging diffused ownership
and passive investing.87 Therefore, the very thin trading of some bank stocks in the
nineteenth century may have resulted in better governance, with investors active in
exercising the rights of participation that their ownership granted them.
Our findings support recent studies which suggest that extended shareholder liab-
ility may not have been a major hindrance to the development of financial capital-
ism.88 Notably, our evidence also suggests that the introduction of limited liability
did not result in an increase in trading activity or liquidity, raising some measure of
doubt as to the importance of limited liability for the development of liquid secondary
markets.
87 Bhide, ‘Stock market liquidity’; A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘Large shareholders and corporate
control’, Journal of Political Economy,  ().
88 Hickson and Turner, ‘Bagehot hypothesis’; Hickson, Turner and McCann, ‘Much ado’.
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